TOP INTEL TODAY 2017 STORIES #8 : “9/11 — Two Unanswered Questions”

“What we do know is that government officials decided not to inform a lawfully constituted body, created by Congress and the president, to investigate one of the greatest tragedies to confront this country. We call that obstruction.”

Thomas H. Kean & Lee H. Hamilton — January 2, 2008, Chair & Vice-Chair of The 9-11 Commission

Moments after United Airlines Flight 175, with 56 passengers (including the 5 hijackers) and 9 crew members, struck the South Tower of the World Trade.

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Why was the Central Intelligence Report, drafted by FBI Special Agent Douglas J. Miller, which contained information about the “Terror Summit” in Kuala Lumpur (January 2000) suppressed and not sent to the FBI? And why was Mark Rossini told to shut up about it?

This post was published on July 6 2017. The two key questions raised by former special agent Mark Rossini are still waiting for an answer…

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On February 24 2017, former FBI Mark Rossini posted the following comment on this blog:

“Thank you for continuing to care and never forget. The only logical explanation for the suppression of the CIR of Special Agent Douglas J. Miller, was to allow the Saudi Mabahith and the CIA to run a joint operation in the USA.

For this op, the Mabahith was given authority to operate on USA soil and the FBI was willfully and purposely excluded by the CIA. Please read the attached document for more. Thank you. Mark T. Rossini”

A recent comment from former CIA Director John Brennan reminded me of this document and, with his kind permission, I decided to repost parts of Rossini’s analysis here today. I certainly agree with Rossini that these questions should be investigated a bit deeper…

The Case according to Rossini

The two questions that have never been addressed are:

Why was the Central Intelligence Report (known as a CIR), drafted by FBI Special Agent Douglas J. Miller (who was detailed to the CIA’s Alec Station), which contained information about the “Terror Summit” in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in January 2000, suppressed and not sent to the FBI?

And why was I [Mark Rossini] told to shut up about it?”

Former FBI SA Mark T. Rossini

As in any case, an “incident” happens and then an investigation is launched, based upon Probable Cause, to determine “Why?”

Directly connected to the “Why” is of course the motive or reason known as “mens rea”.

In the absence of a confession, all cases, civil or criminal, are proven based upon circumstantial evidence, which based upon their totality, would lead a “reasonable person” to conclude logically “the why” of an “incident” and ergo assign responsibility to an individual or a group for said act(s).

Addressing the two questions above, which are directly linked to the 9/11 attacks, I seek to prove the “Why”.


Rossini believes it can be proven circumstantially that the reason why Doug’s CIR was suppressed, and he being ordered to not inform the FBI, was because the CIA was engaged in a recruitment operation along with the Saudi Arabian intelligence service — known as the Mabahith — within the United States, of one or more of the terrorists who met in Malaysia, in direct violation of every applicable rule, regulation and law.

Moreover, and perhaps the most pathetic and emotionally cringing part, is that they, the management of the CIA, Alec Station, and the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, (CTC), did not want the FBI, in the persona of FBI Special Agent-in-Charge John P. O’Neill to interfere in their effort, and or the unilateral effort of the Mabahith, which the CIA would have had to have given permission for. Permission they had no legal authority to do.

This recruitment effort/operation failed miserably, and resulted in the tragic attacks. O’Neill nor the FBI would have allowed such an operation to take place in the USA without the FBI’s management of it and approval from the Attorney General. The fear on the part of the CIA was that the FBI/O’Neill could not be controlled nor could be dissuaded from potentially making arrests and shutting down the operation when they saw fit, and thus causing the Saudi’s “embarrassment”.

The failure of the recruitment operation, or perhaps the Mabahith stopped reporting and/or admitted their failure to the CIA, is the reason CIA/CTC representatives, along with a FBIHQ analyst, came up to FBI NY on or about June 11, 2001 and had a meeting (which I was not invited to) with my assigned squad, I-49, and requested help in finding the terrorists who attended the terror summit in Malaysia.

The FBI Agents at the meeting were not told about the Malaysia terror summit, but just shown pictures of the terrorist attendees and asked to find them. When asked, the CIA/CTC representatives refused to say anything about the provenance of the photos, and refused to answer questions from the agents. Simple logical questions such as, “Who are these guys?”, “Where did you take these pictures, and why?” No answers were given. The only “answers” were “we can’t tell you that”.

Specifically, pictures were shown of one member of the cell, Khalid al-Mihdhar, whom the CIA or Mabahith believed had been recruited or at least open to conversation/approach. Circumstantially it appears that what perhaps prompted this meeting in NY is that al-Mihdhar had returned to Yemen for quite some time (almost a year), and rebuffed the Mabahith/CIA .

Moreover, in the aforementioned meeting (attended by CIA, and the FBI’s Dina Corsi), the CIA would not tell the assembled FBI agents, nor then AUSA Dave Kelly (who left the meeting early due to the hostile atmosphere), why finding these men was so important, hence SA Steve Bongardt’s famous email to Corsi, wherein he warns of her of the consequences that “—someday someone will die—”.

Dina did not know at all about the recruitment effort. Dina just knew that the methodology by which the CIA knew about these terrorists was via an “intelligence method” which Dina erroneously and innocently thought was protected then by the “wall”.

We know that “intelligence method” was the NSA and CIA listening — albeit separately as revealed by Mike Scheuer’s (CIA Alec Station Chief) interview in the Spy Factory documentary — to the telephone line in the home of Ahmed al-Hada in Sanaa, Yemen. A telephone number learned from FBI SA John Anticev’s interview with Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-Owhali in Nairobi, Kenya in August 1998.

Richard Clarke has provided a recitation of his conversation with Cofer Black, who at that time of their conversation was newly appointed as the Director of the CTC.

Clarke is unequivocal in this recorded interview, that when Cofer Black became the Director of the CTC, Black told Clarke “he was appalled that the CIA did not have any sources inside AQ, and he was determined to do something about that”.

Could not the meeting of the hijackers in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and the CIA’s knowledge that at least 2 of the attendees had visas to visit the USA, provide the perfect opportunity?

The record and open source reporting discloses that Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, or “Shakir el-Iraqi”, who was employed as a VIP greeter for Malaysia Airlines in KL, and whom facilitated Khalid al-Mihdhar’s arrival at the KL Airport, and later helped the other terror summit members navigate around KL, was approached by Malaysian authorities and the CIA for cooperation and recruitment.

That effort failed, so the CIA had to turn their focus on another member of the group. What better person to target than one who had a visa to visit the USA. By all indications it seems that Khalid al-Mihdhar was targeted for the very simple reason that his wife back in Yemen was pregnant. The hope and or logic being that he might have some shred of compassion or decency left in him.

Moreover, Richard Clarke stated at a terrorism and security conference at Fordham University (New York City) in May 2016, that he “believes the CIA attempted to recruit Mihdhar, Hazmi in California before 9/11”.

What more information do we need in order to demand an official investigation and disclosure of this effort?

Nova: The Spy Factory Full Video


Complete 911 Timeline: CIA Hiding Knowledge of Alhamzi and Almihdhar — History Commons

Profile: Doug Miller — History Commons

Chief of CIA’s ‘Global Jihad Unit’ Revealed Online — gawker


9/11– Two Unanswered Questions

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